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Financial crises which turn global pose risks for domestic banking sectors, sometimes escalating to fully-
fledged domestic banking crises. Regulatory policy aims to reduce the probability of the spread of risk to the
domestic financial sector and to prevent banking crises during periods of stress. Doing this effectively requires an
understanding of how crises spread — what are the transmission mechanisms, and which of these is likely to be
most important in influencing the outcomes for the banking sector.
Our recent research looks at the experience of the stressful period of 2007-2009 to examine the empirical evidence
for the transmission of the crisis across the 54 global banking centres listed in Table 1. We find significant evidence
of the stress in one jurisdiction influencing another via financial contagion.
Table 1
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While contagion is a common term in the popular
literature, being precise about its meaning and possible
channels of crisis transmission is important in
understanding how the transmission might be mitigated.
We propose a framework which identifies four different
contagion mechanisms. The first two capture changes in
the global market:
Shift contagion captures simply a change in the
general extent of transmission in the global markets
(and could be interpreted as a change in the
interconnectedness of the world’s banking sectors).
Systematic contagion captures a change in the way
in which geographically separated banking sectors
react to global conditions.
The second two mechanisms capture changes in how the
source of the shock affects markets in other jurisdictions:
Idiosyncratic contagion results from the additional
shocks in the crisis-originating market during the
period of stress.
Volatility contagion represents the increase in
volatility spillovers which may occur during periods of
potentially explosive volatility.
In our work, the 2007-2009 crisis is represented as
originating with the US banking sector and we examine
the effect of these four channels on 53 other markets
around the world.
The results show that the majority of the banking markets
experienced changes in their relationship with global risk,
with shift contagion present in almost all cases. Figure 1
gives a Venn diagram representation of the results, with
each circle representing evidence for the three remaining
types of contagion. The majority of countries experienced
systematic and volatility contagion from the source
shock in the US. Idiosyncratic contagion effects are present for 30 of the markets examined. The countries
indicated in red text in the diagram not only had evidence of contagion but also experienced a domestic banking
crisis. We compare the results with those published by Laven and Valencia (2012) about the GDP loss associated
with these banking crises and conclude that countries experiencing systematic and idiosyncratic forms of contagion
suffered on average a 30 percent loss of GDP during the associated crisis.
Figure 1
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These results beg the question as to which channels of transmission policy makers should focus on to prevent
crises originating in different geographic areas from becoming fully fledged domestic banking crises. The usual
advice is to run well-founded macroeconomic policy, with a relatively concentrated banking sector, subject to strong
regulatory capital and focused on retail banking income in preference to other sources.
By relating the data on individual country banking crises with our results, a simple collation suggests that the
presence of systematic and idiosyncratic contagion channels is associated with these crises. Regression analysis
confirms the usual effects of banking capital, concentration and focus on retail activity on reducing the probability of
a banking crisis. It also shows a significant effect of idiosyncratic transmission. Contagion from the crisis-originating
centre significantly increases the probability of a crisis in the recipient country by 37 percent. The effect of
systematic contagion identified in the paper is not significant. However, this does not necessarily mean we should
focus less on this type of transmission – it may simply represent that regulation already does this fairly well. Rather
the results suggest that we can make additional gains by attempting to mitigate the particular transmissions which
are unique to each crisis.
The clear question which arises from this research is to identify what forms of policy interventions might be effective
in reducing these contagion effects. These would target policy responses tailored to shutting down the effects of
transmission uniquely associated with the crisis origin, rather than to the systematic and volatility effects which
seem to be relatively well absorbed in the current environment. Some examples which may fit this category include
short-sales restrictions on financial shocks, and capital flow restrictions, both of which are widely regarded as having
had some success in containing the geographic spread of crises in the past. Other innovative approaches are
needed to provide the regulatory authorities with a wide-ranging armament with which to meet the challenges of
future crisis events.
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Notes:
This article is based on the authors’ paper Contagion and banking crisis – International evidence for 2007–
2009, Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 60, November 2015, Pages 271–283
This post gives the views of the authors, and not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School
of Economics. 
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